Ryan Eccles
MA in Theology and Religious Studies
Abstract
This paper examines the ethical constitution and historical contextualisation of Atheism in Western Europe and the United States today. The legacy of the enlightenment on ‘Western’ conceptions of Atheism will reveal that the desire for totalising truth is as often found within theism as it is in Atheism; this paper will demonstrate through postmodernism that truth is anything other than absolute. Secondly this paper will bring under scrutiny the leading thinkers of ‘New Atheism’ as they stand in opposition to theistic truth claims and the rise of fundamentalism. Finally, Postmodernism will reveal within this binary of atheism and theism faulty historiographies, stagnant conceptions of the method of science and the characteristics of a secular faith.
Modern conceptions of atheism in the West are under threat from postmodernism on account of its modernist character. Most atheists today in the West are either modern or humanists because they are constituted by modern philosophical presuppositions and are made intelligible by a modern epistemology. Modern atheism in the West is a positive atheism that actively refutes the varying ‘proofs’ of an Abrahamic God and sometimes goes as far as taking on an evangelical spirit from its preachers. If modernism disappeared, modern theism and modern atheism would radically reformulate themselves from their present condition in dialectic opposition to each other. Postmodernism subverts and deconstructs the notion that modern atheism can be in binary with modern theism and attempts to uncover the ‘shifty terrain that lies between and beyond theism and atheism’ (Hyman, 2014, p. 174). Unlike the modern atheist, the postmodernist does not believe in ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers predicated upon an objective truth, but instead endless subjectivities and relativities based upon location (Hegel, 1975), ideology (Marx, 2001) and linguistics (Austin, 1962; Derrida, 1988). Hegel and Marx were modernist, but their observations can be appropriated by the postmodern tendency. It will be made clear that the ‘New Atheists’ are anything but new and are in fact derivative modernist by-products of the enlightenment project.
Since postmodernism is averse to the metanarratives of atheism and theism which typically entail a utopian telos (Lyotard, 1984). Modern atheism finds its roots in the enlightenment and scientific revolution which often made universal and objective claims about human beings and their societies. The modern atheist relies on a metanarrative of the Western scientific revolution against the Reformation and fundamentalist religious wars and the enlightenment which came from it which facilitated the political birth of liberalism and conservatism. This is problematic in several ways. The first is that both the scientific revolution and enlightenment were typically composed of deeply religious Western men, rather than atheists. The second problem is that this ‘truth’ of science, or ‘truth’ of enlightenment, is based on a Western location, Western capitalism and the abstract language of the enlightenment. Lyotard (1984) would argue we are reluctant to question the truth of the truth of science. Harris (2006) points to Islamic fundamentalism as an example of religion’s propensity to violence.
However, McGrath (2011) writes that the ‘twentieth century has made clear that the violence and cruelty of God-fearing societies is more than adequately matched by … their godless counterparts’ (p. 40). Despite this subjectivity made clear in three capacities, the ‘four horsemen’ of atheism, Dawkins, Harris, Hitchens and Dennett, have been either unable or unwilling to formulate a response to this, which could be mistaken for a chauvinism of the West towards other cultures (an implication we bear the torch of truth for the rest of the world). Or indeed the West’s estrangement from the rest of the world. It may also reflect the single-minded atheistic-theistic binary in the West against the Abrahamic God, rather than any Hindu deity for example.
Despite this shortcoming of the modern atheists of the West, we see that atheists based in other regions of the world rely on different subjectivities based upon their location, ideology and linguistics, China being one such example. An officially atheist state, with Marxist doctrine and a radically different history and language. The Chinese atheists by virtue of existing disprove any conflation the ‘New Atheists’ or humanistic atheists might make between their ‘objective’ science and reason that contributes to societal advancement and religious tolerance, democracy and egalitarianism.
Modern atheism has historically had a syncretic ideological element to it, be it the ‘race science’ of the 19th century, Marxist continental progressivism or even an Anglo-centric, science based moral consensus in conjunction with liberal democratic, capitalistic values at the ‘End of history and the last man’. Just as an atheist may refute religion through rejection of its various ‘proofs’ and begin deconstruction of religion, i.e. Dawkins arguing it was a patriarchal, sexist, misogynist. Atheism as a social movement has taken upon itself shared norms and values that go along and are a part of, that atheist worldview. These moral values Dawkins argues, should be drawn from a broad ‘consensus’ of the general public. But since the origin of this consensus is based on a Christian worldview, it takes on a modernist character that it is the singularly ‘correct’ form of a scientific society. However, as Derrida (1988) explains, postmodernism fundamentally rejects the notion of a central or objective truth. This means that an atheist declaration that there is no God and we must base all ethical decisions around consensus is in itself an metanarrative that inherits from philosophical (the enlightenment and its religious roots) and religious tradition (the Bible), that there is an objective, singular worldview that is valid. Emotional responses are equal to rational ones in the postmodernist view as the rationality is based upon a major assumption. The ethical foundations of Judeo – Christian thinking, with God at the centre of this moral bedrock created the conditions for a humanistic Christian, and then later humanistic atheist egalitarian worldview, with an ambiguous mixture of both found in the utilitarian and egalitarian John Mill who sought to create a ‘religion of humanity’. However, with the rejection of an Abrahamic God, Nietzsche ‘had little patience with the idea of an inevitable progress of reason or the idea that a natural morality must be humanistic and egalitarian.’ (Saarinen, 2019, p. 2). There is an implication therefore that if the new atheist’s egalitarian values aren’t coming from God, what rationalistic basis is there for them to be universal? This implies that some atheists rely on faith and this equivocation implies their view to be equal to, and not superior to that of a theist. Hyman (2014) puts it succinctly ‘theism against which atheism reacts in relation to which it negatively defines itself is likewise a specifically modern species of theism’ (p. 155).
Harris (2006) has claimed that atheism makes people more self-actualised and healthy to lend credence to the idea of the ‘new atheist’ movements expansion as both desirable and inevitable. However, there are scientific studies to the contrary that point to theists being happier overall (Habermas, 2008 p. 826-827). Therefore, would not Harris as a rational, scientific ‘New Atheist’ reconsider converting more people to atheism considering the science? Would this undermine his entire argument for a ‘New Atheism’? If the purpose of ‘New Atheism’ is not to make you happier, but to pursue a claimed objectivity, what good is that objective truth other than to promote a more unitary cohesive society? Finally, by making the explicit connection between the ‘New Atheists’, humanism and the enlightenment, it becomes clear how postmodernism deconstructs its erroneous binary with theism. In a most fundamental sense, Taylor (1984) argues that the modern atheism fails to ‘question the notion of truth that lies at the heart of the Western theological and philosophical network’ (p. 175). Postmodernism as a tendency can threaten our modern concern for reason and rationality by championing the diverse voices of the ‘other’. This is important because for the postmodernists such as Murray (1998) ‘All human experiencing and knowing is contingent upon the particular (socio-linguistic) practices and (ideologically slanted) perspectives pertaining to each knower (p. 161).’ Therefore, different life experiences are valued equally which undermines the kind of modernist objectivity that Dawkins and Harris would be in favour of.
The ‘New Atheists’ inherited from the enlightenment a Neo-Kantian notion of using reason to construct morality. Kant famously used reason to justify categorical imperatives that must be carried out. Dawkins argues along these lines but perhaps with more room for utilitarianism, that morality must come from societal consensus. Therefore, both groups (German idealists and empiricist neo-positivist atheists) agree on the use of western reason to construct morality. However, it is worth remembering that Kant was a Christian, so the line between reason, faith, science and morality have a long history that is difficult for the ‘New Atheists’ to distance themselves from without creating myths. The modern atheists also must consider that the concept of secularism that they champion was developed by German idealists such as Hegel with the intention of an creating a more inclusive civic society (Perkins, 1970). Dawkins and Harris (2006) argue that a society without religion of any description is one where humans tend towards an almost utopian scientific society where people are fundamentally healthier.
Some postmodernists, such as Taylor (1984), argue that many modern atheists are humanist atheists, who declare the death of God but not the death of the self. This constitutes an anthropocentrism which can only be considered a ‘partial nihilism’ which fails to address that the idea of the self was born from Augustine’s City of God and concluded with Hegel’s reflexive Phenomenology of spirit. The self is born theologically from the idea of the imago dei, and with the death of god there is the ‘loss of the stable centre that had been believed to be the basis of unique individuality (p. 134)’. Therefore, why do humanist atheists continue to define themselves along these lines as Western rational individualists who are so deeply concerned with cultivating an atheistic multitude? Given the polemics the ‘four horsemen’ often produce much to the entertainment of their followers Habermas, (2008) writes that the ‘four horsemen’ have been described as ‘atheistic evangelicals, secular fundamentalists, preachers and so on (p. 1)’. Could it be that the ‘New Atheists’ are in fact a religious phenomenon with their meetings, events and need to preach the objective truth of their gospel, ‘The Selfish Gene’?
Lyotard (1984) wrote of ‘common conception of the social: society is a unified totality, a ‘unicity’ (p. 9). Lyotard describes how the West is composed of self-regulating societies that desire and work towards optimised, totalising truth. ‘One can decide that the principal role of knowledge is an indispensable element in the functioning of society… only if one has decided that society is a giant machine’. Adorno (2016) adds to this by stating ‘Enlightenment is totalitarian. Enlightenment has always taken the basic principle of myth to be anthropomorphism, the projection onto nature of the subjective’ (p. 6). Secularism is conceptualised as the progress of humanity in terms of advances in science, knowledge, law and so forth and an ever-decreasing (and ever more private) role for religion functions as a ‘grand narrative of emancipation’ (Lyotard, 1984) among secularists ideologically.
According to Cimino and Smith (2012), ‘today’s secularists are not content to merely be represented or reading with one another; they also desire to present themselves to the public’ (p. 24). Modern atheism is concerned with using rhetoric to persuade people to join the theological debate over the existence of God, it uses provocative speakers such as Dawkins to stir the crowd and to create enough noise that the ‘New Atheists’ then used to gain more followers, who in America are sometimes persecuted for their non-belief. This might be considered therefore a second wave of secularism beyond a legal tolerance of non-belief, towards a social tolerance. However many atheists would not define themselves as ‘New Atheists’ but appreciate the spreading of awareness in the significantly religious American public. Yet it could be argued by postmodernists that there is a degree to which ‘New Atheism’ attempts to weaponise science as a battering ram for its non-belief while disregarding any scientific study that would jeopardise that concern.
This scientific emphasis is based on a liberal worldview, some atheists historically attempted to construct a religion of science or monism such as Comte (1973). Comte has been thought of by scholars such as Wernick (1999) as a ‘cross-over’ point for positivists and the atheist movement given his recognition that religion provides solidarity, albeit ‘demystified’ (p. 29). Later thinkers in Britain such as Francis Galton were among many who proposed eugenics and framed their values as being scientifically sound that ‘races’ were distinct from one another. This serves to highlight the role ideology can play when attempting to be objective about science and the dangers of not being observant of our own biases. Atheist movements claim liberal values can be scientifically claimed as universal values. Postmodernism disputes this claim. Friedrich Nietzsche has asked the question, which morality should an atheist adhere to Saarinen (2019)? In any case it has typically been a masculine privileging argued Irigaray and Oberle (1985) who highlight in ‘Is the subject of science sexed?’ that men have historically dominated the ‘sciences, philosophy, religion and politics’ (p. 77). It should also be observed that within the ‘New Atheist’ movement’ it is led by and primarily adhered to by, white men, which within a postmodern framework highlights the privileging of certain points of view over others. Dawkins (1998) has criticised Irigaray’s work, dismissing her and postmodernists as ‘intellectuals with nothing to say’ (p. 1), and implying the humanities have less value than the hard sciences. This however begs the question of why the ‘New Atheists’ might value the hard sciences over the humanities and could actually be argued to strengthen Irigaray and Oberle’s argument rather than weaken it as even today the hard sciences are the domain of primarily men.
Milbank (2008) argues that secular discourse is constituted by its opposition to orthodox Christianity. But that secular reason is also complicit with an ontology of violence, starting with Hegel and Marx in the 18th century and in the 19th the growth of sociology and positivism as a new ‘Comtean-Kantian religion of humanity’ (p. 67). The ‘New Atheist’ in the 21st century seeks its very own ‘religion of science’ postmodernists argue in which religion may disappear entirely given it’s argued barbarism and propensity to violence post 2004. However, Harris (2006) said ‘Western powers will continue to spill blood in what is, at bottom, at war of ideas’ (p. 54). Which echoes what McGrath (2011) pointed out about the secularist tyrannies of the 20th century. But it also highlights the foreign policy objectives of the antitheists as anything but scientific or rational, but rather ideological and based upon enlightenment metanarrative. The ‘New Atheist’ seeks therefore to create a cohesive whole, atheistic society rather than allow a coexistence of objective truth claims. The movement frames itself in objective dressing. However, this secular transitory framework we find ourselves in within the West is according to Berry and Wernick (1992) ‘composed out of rearranged fragments of religious discourse which are not its subtexts, but rather make up its whole substance’(p. 37).
Lyotard (1984) argues that our perception of knowledge is changing as we entered an age of computing, that we should be mindful of knowledge as a contingent phenomenon that is based upon context. New Atheism attempts to anchor our perception of knowledge in an empiricist framework but is arguably reactionary in its understanding of knowledge and science as it is based primarily on enlightenment thinking and is unaccommodating of any science that paints Abrahamic religion in a positive light. Feyerabend (1993) has criticised this narrow-minded science of the neo-positivist, empiricist atheists writing ‘variety of opinion is necessary for objective knowledge. And a method that encourages variety is also the only method that is comparable with a humanitarian outlook’ (p. 46). He also stresses how the method of conducting scientific inquiry changes historically not by accident but because sometimes ad hoc hypothesises further knowledge even if they break the rules of scientific methodology.
Modern Western atheism struggles under the scrutiny of postmodernism precisely because it refuses to acknowledge its historical indebtedness to theistic, early modern thinkers. With its failure to address that its fundamental arsenal of scientific enquiry and liberalism is born from specific historical contextualisation it is open to attack from Nietzsche up to the present day. If modern theism is a bravado celebration of this history from Augustine, to the enlightenment, then modern atheism is simply in denial of its influences, and so when it claims objectivity, we know that its scientific objectivity has changed with the times, just as the modern theistic truth-claims have shifted in response to scientific discoveries. For the postmodernist, and even the average person, it could be argued it is becoming clear the polemic binaries of both camps are becoming increasingly disassociated from reality. By privileging the views of white western scientists, postmodernists argue that the ‘new atheists’ are but a mirrored inversion to the theists. By examining the West’s deepening crisis of faith, it becomes clear that postmodernism has left a legacy of self-doubt within both theists and atheists, which may promote future dialogue.
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